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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
ABC Laboratories, Inc. (“ABC”) contests the district
court’s subject matter jurisdiction. The Natural Anonymous
Rights Foundation (“NARF”) invoked district court jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). This Court’s jurisdiction over ABC’s
timely appeal from a final judgment is under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Did the district court err when it denied ABC’s motion to
remand and exercised arising under jurisdiction where ABC’s
state law breach of license claim does not require a court
to determine the ‘287 patent’s scope or validity, which are
insubstantial patent issues, and exercising jurisdiction
would flood federal courts with state contract claims?
2. Did the district court err when it granted NARF’s motion
for summary judgment and invalidated the ‘287 patent where
synthetically created cDNA is patent eligible under 35
U.S.C. § 101 and the ‘287 patent’s method claim, which is
drawn to the application of that cDNA and the newly
discovered PNKY gene, is sufficiently transformative?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
I.

ABC Laboratories, Inc. (“ABC”) And The ‘287 Patent
Masochistic Indomitable Neurotic Drive (“MIND”) Syndrome is

a rare disease that usually leads to embryonic death shortly
after conception in mammals. Record Facts at ¶ 1 (hereinafter

“RF”). In rare cases of survival, “MIND Syndrome causes
megalomania paired with extreme intelligence, and uncontrollable
urges to make repeated attempts to take over the world.” Id.
ABC discovered a genetic sequence associated with MIND
Syndrome. Id. ABC filed a patent application with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) shortly after making
its discovery. Id. at ¶ 2. The PTO then issued U.S. Patent No.
8,000,287 (“the ‘287 patent”) to the private institution.
The ‘287 patent teaches that DNA molecules exist in every
human cell and encode a person’s entire genome. Id. The DNA
double helix contains “crossbars,” which consist of two
chemically joined nucleotides. Id. DNA nucleotide sequences
encode information for making amino acids, which are the
building blocks for proteins. Id. The patent also teaches that
different portions of a DNA strand encode for different genetic
traits. Id. at ¶ 3. These different portions, or sequences of
nucleotides, are “genes.” Id. Not every nucleotide within a gene
codes for proteins, however. Id. The protein coding sequences
are “exons,” and the non-coding sequences are “introns.” Id.
The broadest claim of the ‘287 patent claims “[a]n isolated
cDNA associated with [MIND] Syndrome, wherein the cDNA has the
nucleotide sequence set forth in SEQ. ID NO:1.” Id. at ¶ 4. The
claimed cDNA sequence contains only the coding exons without the
non-coding introns. Id. ABC isolated the claimed sequence from
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the genomic PNKY gene found in human embryos carrying the
syndrome. Id. at ¶ 5. ABC isolated the sequence by reverse
transcription of the mRNA molecules that create the proteins
associated with MIND Syndrome. Id. at ¶ 6. ABC used well-known
techniques to make its discovery. Id.
The ‘287 patent also discloses and claims a method to
screen embryos using the claimed sequence. Id. at ¶ 9. The
method consists of extracting an embryo’s PNKY gene and
comparing it to the claimed sequence. Id. Geneticists and
fertilization technicians can then determine if the embryo’s
PNKY gene includes the claimed sequence associated with MIND
Syndrome. Id. Specifically, the ‘287 patent claims:
10. A method for screening human embryos for a PNKY
gene associated with [MIND] Syndrome in an embryo, the
steps of the method comprising:
comparing a first sequence of a PNKY gene
extracted from the embryo with a second sequence of a
PNKY gene set forth in SEQ. ID NO. 1; and
segregating the embryo if the comparing shows
that the first sequence includes all components of the
second sequence.
Id. ABC developed and marketed a screening test based on this
method in May 2004. Id.
II.

The Natural Anonymous Rights Foundation (“NARF”)

NARF is a non-governmental organization. RF at ¶ 10.
Shortly after ABC made its discovery, NARF-sponsored scientists
at Ramblin State University (“the RSU scientists”) discovered a
genetic sequence associated with MIND Syndrome. Id. The RSU
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scientists discovered the sequence by isolating DNA mutations
unique to human adults that experienced MIND symptoms. Id. The
studied adults had the exact sequence that ABC disclosed and
claimed in the ‘287 patent. Id. at ¶ 11. The sequence was also
in the same PNKY gene from which ABC isolated the claimed
sequence. Id. The sequence the RSU scientists discovered
contains only the exons that code for the same proteins as the
sequence ABC discovered and claimed in its patent. Id. at ¶ 15.
Moreover, the RSU scientists concluded the sequence arose
in the studied adults as a processed pseudogene because the
sequence had no introns. Id. at ¶ 11. Processed pseudogenes are
DNA sequences that derive from the same process lab technicians
use to create cDNA. Id. at ¶ 12. These processed pseudogenes are
“naturally occurring cDNA strands in the human genome that are
structurally, functionally, and chemically identical to cDNA”
created in the laboratory. Id. Scientists believe pseudogenes
form when a naturally occurring virus reverse transcribes the
mRNA associated with the pseudogene. Id. Even though most
pseudogenes are non-functional, the RSU scientists determined
the pseudogene they discovered is active and creates the
proteins that cause MIND Syndrome in adults. Id. at ¶ 13.
The RSU scientists then created a screening test based on
this pseudogene. Id. at ¶ 16. The test identifies embryonic and
adult versions of MIND Syndrome. Id. at ¶ 17. NARF made this
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test available to fertilization clinics and embryonic testing
suppliers beginning in October 2004. Id. at ¶ 16.
III. The License Agreement And Subsequent Dispute
After the PTO issued the ‘287 patent, ABC sent demand
letters to fertilization clinics, end users, and embryonic
testing suppliers that used NARF’s test. RF at ¶ 18. In the
letters, ABC threatened to sue users of NARF’s screening test
for infringing the ‘287 patent. Id. ABC and NARF then entered
into a license agreement, allowing NARF to continue distributing
its test, id., in exchange for royalties. Id. at ¶ 19.
The license defines the “Licensed Product” as “any test
covered by a claim of the [‘287] Patent.” Id. at ¶ 18. The
license also states the term of the agreement is tied to the
validity of the ‘287 patent. Id. The term clause states:
This agreement shall remain in full force and effect
for the complete term of the [‘287] Patent unless (i)
all claims of the [‘287] Patent are held invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, in
which case the term of this agreement shall end upon
the date all appeals from which any corresponding
order or judgment have been exhausted, or (ii) either
party breaches any provision of this agreement. In the
event the [‘287] Patent is held invalid or
unenforceable by a court of competent jurisdiction, no
royalties will be owed under this license.
Id. The agreement covers the fertilization clinics, end users,
and embryonic testing suppliers that use NARF’s test. Id.
In 2010, NARF sought permission from ABC to use the test
royalty-free to conduct research on adults. Id. at ¶ 23. ABC
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refused. Id. Nevertheless, in mid-2011, NARF began offering free
MIND Syndrome screenings to NARF members. Id. at ¶ 24. NARF paid
no royalties to ABC for these screenings. Id.
ABC subsequently sued NARF in Ramblin state court in
December 2011, claiming NARF breached the license agreement. Id.
at ¶ 25. NARF answered by claiming the ‘287 patent is invalid
and that claim 10 of the ‘287 patent covers only embryonic
testing. Id. NARF then removed to the United States District
Court for the District of Ramblin pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
Id. NARF also filed a declaratory judgment counterclaim, seeking
a declaration that the ‘287 patent is invalid. Id.
ABC timely filed a motion to remand. Id. at ¶ 26. In
support of its opposition to ABC’s motion, NARF submitted a
declaration by Professor Elle Vira. Id. The declaration states
that “nearly [fifty] patent applications [are] pending at the
USPTO, which relate to patents for cDNA where the differences
between cDNA and gDNA are minimal or nonexistent.” Id.
IV.

The District Court Denies ABC’s Motion To Remand And
Rules The ‘287 Patent Is Invalid As A Matter Of Law

The district court denied ABC’s motion to remand and
granted NARF’s motion for summary judgment, invalidating the
‘287 patent. Conclusions of Law at ¶¶ 1, 4 (hereinafter “CL”).
Accepting subject matter jurisdiction, the court recognized that
ABC’s breach of license claim does not directly arise under the
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patent law pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Id. at ¶ 1. In any
case, the court ruled ABC’s “breach of license claim necessarily
required the court to decide unsettled issues of patent law,
which establish them as substantial federal issues.” Id. at ¶ 3.
In ruling the ‘287 patent invalid, the court recognized
that non-naturally occurring cDNA is patentable. Id. at ¶ 4. But
the court ruled the ‘287 patent lacked patent eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because “the DNA sequence claimed
in the ‘287 patent was naturally occurring and known to cause
the claimed symptoms in at least some individuals afflicted with
MIND Syndrome.” Id. at ¶ 5. ABC appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1295.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse and vacate the district court’s
ruling because the district court incorrectly (1) exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and (2) invalidated the ‘287 patent’s
cDNA and method claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
First, the district court incorrectly exercised arising
under jurisdiction because ABC’s claim fails the Grable test.
The ‘287 patent’s scope is not an essential element of ABC’s
claim because the claim only requires a court to interpret the
license and determine the royalties NARF owes ABC. Nor does the
claim necessarily raise the patent’s validity because courts
presume patent validity and NARF raises invalidity as a defense.
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Even if ABC’s claim implicates a patent question, that question
is insubstantial to the patent system because it will not
control numerous other cases. Finally, exercising jurisdiction
over this case will disrupt the states’ ability to develop their
own bodies of contract law and overflow federal court dockets.
Therefore, this Court should reverse the district court’s denial
of ABC’s motion to remand and vacate the lower court’s ruling.
Second, the district court misapplied the Supreme Court’s
holding in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
Inc. to invalidate the ‘287 patent. This Court should correct
the lower court and hold the ‘287 patent’s cDNA claim is patent
eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Although products of nature are
not patent eligible, products of human ingenuity are. In AMP,
the Court held cDNA, as a product of man, is patent eligible
subject matter. The Court’s holding was narrow and drew a line
for patentability of genetic materials. Thus, ABC’s cDNA claim
is patentable. Moreover, ABC’s method claim is patent eligible.
The claim is drawn to the patentable synthetic cDNA that ABC
discovered, and its application to the PNKY gene involves more
than abstract ideas. Therefore, this Court should reverse the
district court’s grant of NARF’s motion for summary judgment.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court’s exercise of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338(a) is a legal issue this Court reviews de novo. In re
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Cambridge Biotech Corp., 186 F.3d 1356, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
This Court also reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, affirming only when the material facts are
undisputed and “the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” Crown Operations Int’l, Ltd. v. Solutia Inc.,
289 F.3d 1367, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Finally, this Court also
reviews a patent claim’s subject matter eligibility under 35
U.S.C. § 101 de novo. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir.
2008), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
ARGUMENT
This Court should reverse and vacate the district court’s
ruling because the district court incorrectly (1) exercised
arising under jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim
under 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) and (2) ruled the ‘287 patent’s cDNA
and method claims patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
I. The District Court Incorrectly Denied ABC’s Motion To
Remand And Exercised Arising Under Jurisdiction Over ABC’s
Breach Of License Claim.
Removal is proper only if ABC Laboratories, Inc. (“ABC”)
could have originally brought this state action in federal
court. Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg.,
545 U.S. 308, 312 (2005). Federal courts, however, “are courts
of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized
by Constitution and statute.” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059,
1064 (2013). Congress granted federal district courts exclusive
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jurisdiction over “any civil action arising under any Act of
Congress relating to patents.” 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a). Under this
provision and its predecessors, courts have long held contract
disputes belong in state court. See, e.g., Aronson v. Quick
Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979) (“State law is not
displaced merely because the contract relates to [an invention]
which may or may not be patentable.”); Luckett v. Delpark, Inc.,
270 U.S. 496, 510 (1926) (“[W]here a patentee complaint makes
his suit one for recovery of royalties under a contract of
license . . . or for damages for a breach of its covenants . . .
he does not give the federal District Court jurisdiction of the
cause as one arising under the patent laws.”).
As with arising under jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331,
patent jurisdiction exists only when the face of the plaintiff’s
well pled complaint presents a patent question. Christianson v.
Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 808–09 (1988). The
complaint must “set[] up a right under the patent laws as ground
for a recovery,” Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge Co.,
185 U.S. 282, 287 (1902), or “make it appear that some right or
privilege will be defeated by one construction or sustained by
the opposite construction of” the patent law. Id. at 286. Patent
defenses, however, cannot create jurisdiction even if a defense
is the only contested issue in the case. Christianson, 486 U.S.
at 809. If multiple theories support the plaintiff’s claim, then
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the claim also does not arise under the patent law, “unless
patent law is essential” to each theory. Id. at 810. Although
recent amendments to the Patent Act allow counterclaims arising
under the patent law to provide grounds for removal, Paul R.
Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court, 54 Wm. & Mary
L. Rev. 1791, 1808 (2013), the plaintiff remains the master of
his suit and may avoid federal jurisdiction by relying on state
law. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
Generally, a case may arise under the patent law in two
ways. Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1064 (2013). First, the
most direct path is when patent law creates the cause of action.
Id. Patent law, however, does not create ABC’s breach of license
claim. Second, in a “special and small category” of cases,
Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677,
699 (2006), a federal court may exercise jurisdiction over a
state law claim if a federal issue is “(1) necessarily raised,
(2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of
resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state
balance approved by Congress.” Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1065
(hereinafter “Grable test”) (citing Grable & Sons Metal Prods.,
Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).
Here, the district court misapplied the Grable test and
exercised jurisdiction over ABC’s breach of license claim. CL at
¶ 3. The district court erred because (A) ABC’s claim does not
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necessarily raise the ‘287 patent’s scope or validity, (B) ABC’s
claim does not implicate a substantial issue of patent law, and
(C) federal court resolution of this case would disrupt the
congressionally approved federal-state court balance.
A. ABC’s Breach Of License Claim Does Not Necessarily
Raise The ‘287 Patent’s Scope Or Validity.
ABC’s claim does not necessarily raise a federal issue. A
state claim necessarily raises a federal issue when federal law
is an essential element of the claim. Grable, 545 U.S. at 315.
First, the ‘287 patent’s scope is not an essential element
because ABC’s claim only requires a court to interpret the
license and determine the royalties that NARF owes ABC. Second,
the patent’s validity is not an essential element because courts
presume patent validity and NARF raises invalidity as a defense.
First, ABC’s claim does not necessarily raise the ‘287
patent’s scope. Courts must pay attention to a plaintiff’s
requested relief when examining whether a claim arises under the
patent law. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. v. Nippon Tel. & Tel.
Corp., 414 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2005). Moreover, this
Court has held breach of license claims do not arise under the
patent law. Ballard Med. Prods. v. Wright, 823 F.2d 527, 530
(Fed. Cir. 1987). In Ballard, the licensee claimed the patenteelicensor breached the license by manufacturing, selling, and
licensing products that fell within the scope of the exclusive
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license. Id. at 529. Although the scope of the licensed patent
controlled the scope of the license, this Court held “that rule
of contract law cannot possibly convert a suit for breach of
contract into one ‘arising under’ the patent laws.” Id. at 530.
Here, as master of its suit, ABC brought a breach of
license claim, seeking the state remedy of royalties due under
the license. RF at ¶ 25. As in Ballard, although the ‘287
patent’s scope may control the scope of the license, that does
not suggest ABC’s state claim arises under the patent law.
To the extent ABC’s claim implicates the ‘287 patent’s
scope, ABC’s complaint does not raise the patent’s scope as an
essential element to each of ABC’s theories for recovery. If
multiple theories support a plaintiff’s claim, the claim does
not arise under the patent law “unless patent law is essential”
to each theory. Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486
U.S. 800, 810 (1988). ABC’s claim, however, only requires a
court to interpret the license to ascertain each party’s unique
obligations and the royalties that NARF owes ABC. NARF also
raises the patent’s scope as a defense. RF at ¶ 25. But patent
defenses cannot create jurisdiction. Christianson, 486 U.S. at
809. Thus, the ‘287 patent’s scope is not an essential element.
Second, ABC’s claim does not necessarily raise the ‘287
patent’s validity. Although the term of the license is tied to
the ‘287 patent’s validity, RF at ¶ 18, the patent’s validity is
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not an essential element because courts presume patent validity.
Allergan, Inc. v. Sandoz Inc., 726 F.3d 1286, 1291 (Fed. Cir.
2013). Thus, ABC’s complaint does not require ABC to prove the
‘287 patent’s validity in order to recover from NARF. To the
extent ABC’s claim raises the patent’s validity, NARF raises it
only as a defense to ABC’s state action. RF at ¶ 25. Patent law
defenses, however, cannot create federal patent jurisdiction.
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809; see also Intermedics Infusaid v.
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 804 F.2d 129, 132–33 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(holding state courts may resolve contract claims where the
claimant seeks royalties due under a patent license even when
the defendant challenges the patent’s validity).
In sum, the ‘287 patent’s scope is not an essential element
of ABC’s breach of license claim because ABC seeks only state
law remedies. Nor is the ‘287 patent’s validity an essential
element because courts presume patent validity and NARF raises
invalidity only as a defense. Thus, ABC’s state law breach of
license claim does not necessarily raise federal patent issues.
B. ABC’s Breach Of License Claim Does Not Implicate A
Substantial Issue Of Federal Patent Law.
ABC’s claim does not contain a substantial patent issue. An
issue is substantial when it is “significant to the federal
system as a whole,” Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059, 1068
(2013), implicating a “serious federal interest” in litigating
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the matter in federal court. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313.
Several factors are indicative of a “substantial” patent
issue. (1) Pure questions of law, Empire Healthchoice Assurance,
Inc. v. McVeigh, 547 U.S. 677, 700–01 (2006); (2) questions that
will control numerous other cases, Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at 1067; and
(3) questions the Federal Government has a direct interest in
litigating in federal court, Grable, 545 U.S. at 315, are
substantial issues. Here, none of these factors are present.
First, even if ABC’s claim requires a court to determine
whether NARF’s test falls within the ‘287 patent’s scope, that
determination is not a pure question of law. “[F]act-bound and
situation-specific,” Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 699, state
claims do not fall within the narrow category of state claims
that arise under federal law. Id. at 700–01. Rather than require
an application of federal law to facts, the state claim should
present a pure issue of federal law. See id. at 700.
In Grable, the interpretation of a federal statute was a
“pure issue of law.” See Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 700
(discussing Grable). But here, determining whether NARF’s test
falls within the ‘287 patent’s scope is a mixed question of law
and fact. MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720 F.3d
833, 842 (11th Cir. 2013). Although claim construction is a
legal question, whether NARF’s test reads on any claim of the
‘287 patent is a factual question. WMS Gaming Inc. v. Int’l Game
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Tech., 184 F.3d 1339, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Thus, this case
does not present a pure question of law. Rather, a court must
only apply federal law to facts; a task a state court is
competent to do. See Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 701.
Even though the ‘287 patent’s subject matter eligibility is
a question of law, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 951 (Fed. Cir.
2008), NARF raises invalidity as a defense. RF at ¶ 25. Patent
law defenses, however, cannot create arising under jurisdiction.
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 809
(1988). Thus, the fact the ‘287 patent’s validity is a question
of law is irrelevant to this Court’s substantiality analysis.
Second, resolving the potential patent question here would
not control other cases. In Gunn, the “hypothetical” patent
issue was insubstantial because of the backward-looking nature
of legal malpractice claims. 133 S. Ct. at 1066–67. No matter
how a state court handled the hypothetical issue, it would not
change the fact a federal court invalidated the patent in the
“real-world” patent litigation. Id. at 1067. Nor would allowing
state courts to adjudicate hypothetical patent issues undermine
the uniformity of patent law because “federal courts are . . .
not bound by state court case-within-a-case patent rulings.” Id.
Moreover, the asserted patent issue was not novel such that its
resolution “would be controlling in numerous other cases.” Id.
Thus, the federal courts’ familiarity with patent law, alone,
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did not justify federal jurisdiction. Id. at 1068.
Similarly, a state court interpretation of the ‘287 patent
would not bind federal courts or have preclusive effects. See
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S.
313, 350 (1971). Only a federal court’s interpretation of the
patent would estop ABC in future cases. Id. For example, if a
federal court declared the ‘287 patent invalid, the patent would
be invalid to the entire world. But if a state court ruled the
‘287 patent invalid, the patent would be invalid to only these
parties. Thus, a state court ruling on the patent’s scope or
validity would not bind federal courts in subsequent suits.
In addition, the ‘287 patent’s scope and validity are not
novel patent issues that will control other cases. As discussed
below, see infra Part II, cDNA is patentable subject matter.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107, 2119 (2013). Even if this case presents a novel patent
issue, it will surely arise again in an actual patent case where
federal courts will have jurisdiction. See Gunn, 133 S. Ct. at
1067. If the issue does not arise again, then “it is unlikely to
implicate substantial federal interests.” Id.
Moreover, the possibility that a state court will mishandle
a state claim, alone, does not create federal jurisdiction. See
id. at 1068. Even if a state court errs, that error will affect
only these parties—not the entire federal system. See Blonder-
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Tongue, 402 U.S. at 350. In fact, a state court’s interpretation
of patent law would have no precedential effect on federal case
law. Byrne v. Wood, Herron & Evans LLP, 676 F.3d 1024, 1035
(Fed. Cir. 2012) (O’Malley, J., dissenting from the denial of a
petition for rehearing en banc) (citing Adventure Outdoors, Inc.
v. Bloomberg, 552 F.3d 1290, 1301 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding a
“state court interpretation of the gun statutes will not be
controlling in numerous other cases because it will not have
precedential effect in the federal system”)). Therefore, this
case’s disposition will not control numerous other cases.
Third, state court resolution of this case would not hinder
the government’s intent to have uniformity in the patent law. In
Grable, the meaning of a federal tax statute was a substantial
federal issue. 545 U.S. at 315. The Court focused on the broader
significance of the question and the government’s “strong
interest” in collecting taxes. Id. The IRS also had a “direct
interest” in vindicating its action in a federal forum. Id.
Here, the government’s interest in ABC’s fact-based
contract claim is insignificant compared to the government’s
interest in a legal question affecting its ability to raise
revenue. See MDS (Canada) Inc. v. Rad Source Techs., Inc., 720
F.3d 833, 842 (11th Cir. 2013). This case also does not require
a court to determine whether a federal agency complied with a
federal statute. See Empire Healthchoice, 547 U.S. at 700
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(noting Grable centered on whether the IRS complied with a
federal statute). Nor will the result of this private action
influence the PTO’s decision to issue future patents. See MDS
(Canada) Inc., 720 F.3d at 843. Thus, the government does not
have an interest in litigating this matter in federal court.
In sum, ABC’s claim does not present a pure issue of law
that will control numerous other cases. Nor does the government
have a direct interest in ABC’s state claim. Therefore, ABC’s
claim does not implicate a substantial patent issue.
C. Federal Court Adjudication Of ABC’s Claim Will Disrupt
The Federal-State Court Division Of Labor.
Federal court resolution of this state claim will disrupt
the federal-state court balance. Even when a federal issue is
substantial, a federal court may veto jurisdiction if exercising
jurisdiction would disrupt the congressionally approved federalstate court balance. Grable, 545 U.S. at 313. This inquiry
focuses on the proper “balance of federal and state judicial
responsibilities,” id. at 314, limiting jurisdiction to state
claims that “justify resort to the experience” and “uniformity
that a federal forum offers on federal issues.” Id. at 312. Even
if ABC’s claim raises a substantial patent issue, this Court
should veto jurisdiction because exercising jurisdiction will
(1) disrupt the states’ ability to develop their own bodies of
contract law and (2) cause federal court dockets to overflow.
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First, state courts have traditionally adjudicated contract
disputes. See, e.g., Luckett v. Delpark, Inc., 270 U.S. 496, 510
(1926). Accordingly, exercising arising under jurisdiction over
contract claims like this would disrupt the states’ ability to
develop their own bodies of contract law and provide contractual
remedies to their citizens. See Gully v. First Nat’l Bank, 299
U.S. 109, 115 (1936). Even while acknowledging Congress’s desire
for uniformity, this Court has recognized that “Congress was not
concerned that an occasional patent law decision of a . . .
state court[] would defeat its goal of increased uniformity” in
the patent law. Atari, Inc. v. JS & A Grp., Inc., 747 F.2d 1422,
1432 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Second, exercising jurisdiction over this type of case will
cause federal court dockets to overflow. In Grable, the Court
did not exercise its veto power because only the “rare state
title case” will raise a contested federal issue. 545 U.S. at
315. But exercising jurisdiction over contract claims involving
a patent would attract “a horde of original filings and removal
cases raising other [contract] claims with embedded federal
issues.” Id. at 318. Congress did not intend this result when it
granted federal courts jurisdiction over patent cases, not
questions. See Excelsior Wooden Pipe Co. v. Pac. Bridge Co., 185
U.S. 282, 286–87 (1902). Thus, even if ABC’s claim implicates a
substantial patent issue, this Court should veto jurisdiction to
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maintain the appropriate federal-state court balance.
In sum, the lower court incorrectly exercised jurisdiction
over this case for three reasons. First, the ‘287 patent’s scope
and validity are not essential elements of ABC’s claim. Second,
even if ABC’s claim raises a patent issue, that issue is not
substantial. Third, federal court resolution of this case would
disrupt the states’ ability to develop their own bodies of
contract law. Thus, this Court should reverse the district
court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand and vacate its ruling.
II. Even If The District Court Had Jurisdiction, The District
Court Incorrectly Granted NARF’s Motion For Summary
Judgment Because ABC’s Patent Claims Are Patent Eligible.
The ‘287 patent’s cDNA and method claims are drawn to
patentable subject matter. The Patent Act states, “[w]hoever
invents or discovers any new and useful . . . composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. But laws of nature, natural phenomena,
and abstract ideas are not patentable. Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1293 (2012) (citing
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981)). Thus, inventors
cannot patent “the basic tools of science” and “inhibit future
innovation premised upon them.” Id. at 1301. Interpreting these
exceptions too broadly, however, could “eviscerate patent law,”
as all inventions utilize the laws of nature. Id. at 1293.
The district court misapplied Supreme Court precedent when it
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granted NARF’s motion for summary judgment and invalidated the
‘287 patent. Specifically, the court erred because (A) manmade
cDNA is patent eligible, and (B) ABC’s method claim is drawn to
patent eligible subject matter.
A. Products Of Nature Are Patent Ineligible, But Products
Of Man Are Patent Eligible.
ABC’s cDNA claim is patentable under § 101 because cDNA is
the product of human ingenuity. While realizing the need to
strike a “balance between creating incentives that lead to
creation, invention, and discovery and imped[ing] the flow of
information that might permit, indeed spur, innovation,” Ass’n
for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct.
2107, 2116 (2013) (alteration in original), the Court has
reviewed the patentability of claims derived from nature.
In Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., the Court
held a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria patent ineligible
because the patentee did not alter the bacteria in any way. 333
U.S. 127, 128–29, 132 (1948). In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,
however, scientists genetically modified bacterium to break down
components of crude oil. 447 U.S. 303, 305 (1980). The Court
held this modified bacterium patentable because the organism was
“a product of human ingenuity,” not nature. Id. at 309.
Most recently, in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics, Inc., the Court held Myriad’s genomic DNA claims were
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invalid products of nature. 133 S. Ct. at 2111. The Court found
that Myriad did not create anything and held, “separating [a]
gene from its surrounding genetic material is not an act of
invention.” Id. at 2117.
Despite the Court’s holding that DNA isolated from its
natural environment is patent ineligible, the Court also 1) held
that cDNA is patent eligible and 2) drew a line for patenting
genetic material. Thus, ABC’s cDNA claim is patent eligible.
1) The AMP v. Myriad Court Held cDNA Is Patent Eligible
Subject Matter Under Section 101.
The AMP Court recognized the distinction between genetic
material isolated from its natural setting and synthetically
created cDNA. See id. at 2112. Indeed, that distinction was the
Court’s basis for stating, “cDNA does not present the same
obstacles to patentability as naturally occurring, isolated DNA
segments.” Id. at 2119. The Court then held that synthetically
created cDNA is patent eligible subject matter. Id. at 2111.
Scientists synthetically create DNA using several known
methods. See id. at 2112. One method begins with natural mRNA
molecules, which the researcher manipulates through several
steps to create a new strand of DNA. See id. This DNA is cDNA.
Id. cDNA differs from genomic DNA because it contains only the
coding exons without the non-coding introns. Id. Although nature
dictates the cDNA’s sequence, the Court concluded, “the lab
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technician unquestionably creates something new when cDNA is
made.” Id. at 2119. Thus, the Court held cDNA is patentable
because it is a product of man. Id.
2) The AMP v. Myriad Holding Was Intentionally Narrow
And Drew A Well-Defined Line For Patent Eligibility.
The Court’s narrow decision resulted in it holding Myriad’s
genomic DNA claims ineligible and cDNA claims patent eligible
products of human ingenuity. Id. at 2119–20. The opinion’s final
sentence reveals the decision’s scope: “[w]e merely hold that
genes and the information they encode are not patent eligible
under § 101 simply because they have been isolated from the
surrounding genetic material.” Id. at 2120. The Court noted that
method claims were not before the Court, and it expressed no
opinion on genomic DNA patentability under §§ 102, 103, and 112.
See id. at 2119–20. But the Court did hold that synthetic DNA,
such as cDNA, is patent eligible even though its sequence
derives from the natural material. Id. at 2119.
ABC’s cDNA claim is patentable because ABC synthetically
created the cDNA. ABC determined the PNKY gene was responsible
for MIND Syndrome and elucidated its sequence. RF at ¶ 5. After
identifying the mutation, ABC synthesized the claimed sequence
using the mRNA associated with MIND syndrome. Id. at ¶ 6. ABC
then claimed the cDNA sequence derived from the mutated PNKY
gene in the ‘287 patent. Id. at ¶ 4. The product of this process
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of synthetically creating cDNA from mRNA is what the Court held
patentable in Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119.
ABC did not isolate the cDNA from its surrounding material, but
created the cDNA using human ingenuity and experimentation.
Thus, the claimed cDNA is patent eligible subject matter.
This case, however, presents an unusual occurrence that the
Court addressed in a footnote. Id. at 2119 n.8. In rare cases,
genomic DNA may contain no introns. Id. The cDNA derived in such
cases is identical to the genomic DNA. RF at ¶ 15. The Court
appreciated that such viral-derived “pseudogenes” may occur in
rare cases. Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119
n.8. Indeed, the Court noted, “[t]he possibility that an unusual
and rare phenomenon might randomly create a molecule similar to
one created synthetically through human ingenuity does not
render a composition of matter nonpatentable.” Id. The fact the
Court addressed the possibility of such a rarity, with language
allowing for patentability in such cases, underscores the
Court’s intent to maintain the line drawn by its holding.
Accordingly, the Court intends that its recent modification
to the patent law remain undisturbed and the line it drew remain
the law. In sum, the synthetically created cDNA that ABC claimed
in the ‘287 patent is patent eligible.
B. The ‘287 Patent’s Method Claim Is Patentable.
ABC’s method claim is drawn to patentable subject matter.
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Method claims are patentable if they “transform an unpatentable
law of nature into a patent-eligible application of such a law,
[but] one must do more than simply state the law . . . while
adding the words ‘apply it.’” Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1294 (2012). A process
reciting a law of nature, however, should contain “additional
features that provide practical assurance that the process is
more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the law of
nature itself.” Id. at 1297.
Although the Court did not have method claims before it in
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2119, the Court
endorsed Judge Bryson’s view that “[a]s the first party with
knowledge of the [BRCA] sequences, Myriad was in an excellent
position to claim applications of that knowledge. Many of its
unchallenged claims are limited to such applications.” Id. at
2120 (quoting Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Bryson,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Thus, methods
applying patentable subject matter are valid.
ABC’s method claim is patentable. The claim is distinct
from Mayo’s method claims and does not claim only routine
mechanics of comparison. RF at ¶ 9. Thus, ABC’s method claim is
patentable because the claim applies 1) a patentable cDNA
sequence 2) to the MIND Syndrome biomarker that ABC discovered.
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1) The Method Claim Uses Patent Eligible cDNA.
ABC’s method claim is drawn to patent eligible cDNA. This
Court upheld Myriad’s method claims applying patent eligible
subject matter because “once one has determined that a claimed
composition of matter is patent-eligible subject matter,
applying various known types of procedures to it is not merely
applying conventional steps to a law of nature.” Ass’n for
Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689 F.3d
1303, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2012). In endorsing this Court’s reasoning
on the new application of knowledge of the BRCA genes, the
Supreme Court indicated that Mayo is inapplicable when the
subject matter is patent eligible. See Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2120. Thus, this Court’s reasoning in
AMP is controlling. And the “comparison” step of ABC’s method
claim does not change the fact that claim 10 is based on manmade
patent eligible subject matter. Id. Thus, ABC’s method claim is
patent eligible.
2) Application Of The Newly Discovered PNKY Gene
Involves More Than Abstract Ideas.
Even if ABC’s cDNA claim is invalid, ABC’s method claim is
valid because the method claim is transformative. To determine
if a method claim to ineligible subject matter is patentable,
the question is whether the patent claim “add[s] enough to [the
natural laws] to allow the process [the inventors] describe to
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qualify as patent-eligible processes that apply natural laws.”
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1297 (2012). Here, the method claim, which differs from
those in Mayo, describes a patent eligible method as in Diamond
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
In Mayo, the claims only instructed physicians to consider
known natural laws when treating patients. 132 S. Ct. at 1298.
Physicians administered known drugs and analyzed the patient’s
blood for a known metabolite. Id. at 1297. The claims involved
no new assay or biomarker. Id. at 1296. Rather, the claims only
instructed physicians to modify the amount of drug prescribed
according to the levels of the metabolite; activities that
scientists in the field previously engaged in. Id. at 1298.
Unlike Mayo, ABC’s method claim applies the subject matter
ABC discovered. ABC discovered the MIND Syndrome mutation ABC
claimed as cDNA. RF at ¶ 1. Application of a standard chemical
assay to the discovered biomarker to probe the existence of the
newly understood MIND syndrome is not routine activity. Also,
prior to ABC’s discovery of the MIND syndrome, there is no
indication that any other lab could utilize standard techniques
to detect and diagnose the syndrome in embryos or adults.
Finally, all of the procedures and elements of the claim in Mayo
were known in the field, but only the comparison step of the
‘287 patent’s method claim was known at the time of filing; the
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MIND syndrome gene was unknown.
In Diehr, a method drawn to ineligible subject matter was
patentable because the application was transformative as a
whole. 450 U.S. at 185. There, the patentee claimed a process
for curing rubber based on the Arrhenius equation. Id. at 177–
78. The general principles of curing rubber and the equation
were known at the time but application of the equation to the
process resulted in a new process. See id. at 177–79. The
process included “installing rubber in a press, closing the
mold, constantly determining the temperature of the mold,
constantly recalculating the appropriate cure time through the
use of the formula and a digital computer, and automatically
opening the press at the proper time.” Id. at 187.
The Court held the process was transformative because of
the way the process’s additional steps integrated the Arrhenius
equation into the process as a whole. See id. The process claim
did not seek a monopoly on all uses of the equation, but “only
to foreclose from others the use of that equation in conjunction
with all of the other steps in their claimed process.” Id. at
187. Thus, the process was patentable. Id.
Similarly, claim 10 of the ‘287 patent is patent eligible
because it contains a transformative combination of operations.
Although genetic manipulations are known in the field, claim
10’s comparison and segregation steps integrate the cDNA into
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the process as a whole. RF at ¶ 9. Further, the claim does not
preclude other uses of the cDNA sequence. Indeed, the method
claim is limited to the use of the cDNA sequence in conjunction
with the comparison and segregation steps of the claimed
process. The claim does not preclude the use of isolated genomic
DNA, nor does the claim prevent research on such sequences.
Thus, the ‘287 patent’s method claim is patent eligible.
In sum, both the composition of matter claim of the ‘287
patent and the method claim utilizing the MIND syndrome
biomarker are patent eligible. Therefore, ABC’s patent is valid.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should REVERSE the
district court’s denial of ABC’s motion to remand and VACATE the
district court’s grant of NARF’s motion for summary judgment.
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